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Abstract: For hunting an externality arises due to open-access but in all Western countries, 
including Denmark, regulation of hunting is very complex. Often it involves combining harvest 
fees, licenses, subsidies, self-reporting and enforcement. Of course such complex regulation 
raises huge information requirements. For this reason Abildtrup and Jensen (2014) propose 
to simplify the regulation. The point of departure in Abildtrup and Jensen (2014) is that 
regulator does not need to measure individual harvest and, therefore, a moral hazard problem 
arises (see e.g. Laffont and Tirole, 1992). With this observation Abildtrup and Jensen (2014) 
propose to use a population tax as regulatory instrument. If the population level is larger than 
a target population level each hunter receives an individual, variable subsidy while an 
individual, variable tax is used if the target population level is larger than the actual 
population level. By proper selection of a variable tax and subsidy rate the population tax will 
secure a first-best optimum. However, the tax in Abildtrup and Jensen (2014) requires that 
the population level can be perfectly measured. Even though the population level can be 
roughly estimated from, for example, damage or trees and crops this assumption is of course 
not reasonable and it is a well-known fact that within hunting population levels is not 
perfectly measurable. For this reason we treat the population level as a stochastic variable in 
the present paper. With uncertain population levels we have two market failures (open-access 
and uncertain population level. With two market failures we need two policy instruments to 
secure a first-best optimum and following Xepapadeas (1995) and Jensen and Vestergaard 
(2007) we suggest combining a population tax and a tax on voluntary, self-reported harvest. 
Provided that individual hunters are risk-averse they will voluntary choose to self-report part 
of their harvest. The intuition behind this result is that the hunters prefer a certain self-
reporting tax over an uncertain population tax if they are risk-averse. In the paper we 
calculate the value of the population tax rate and self-reporting tax rate. The population tax 
rate consists of three elements. First, the difference in net benefits between regulator and 
individual hunters are included. Second, the marginal risk-aversion shall be taken into 
  
account. Third, the marginal value of increased self-reporting tax payments must be 
incorporated. Concerning the self-reporting tax rate, this rate also takes three elements into 
account. First, the marginal population tax shall be included. Second, the variance of the 
uncertain population level is included in the tax rate. Third, the tax rate must take the 
marginal risk-aversion into account. Note that the combination of a population tax and self-
reporting tax secures a first-best optimum because the individual hunter pays the full costs of 
the two market failures. 
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